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CAN META-ANALYSIS BE TRUSTED? 
Until around 25 years ago the only way to assimilate and evaluate research evidence was through 
discursive literature reviews in which someone with an interest in a given research topic would 
accumulate and subjectively evaluate the importance of research findings in that area. These 
reviews, although informative, are highly reliant on the discretion of the author who, with the 
best will in the world, could be unaware of important findings or give particular importance to 
studies that others might believe to be relatively less important (see Wolf, 1986). The failure of 
literature reviews to provide objective ways to assimilate scientific evidence led scientists to 
look for a statistical solution. The groundbreaking work of Glass (1976) and Rosenthal and Rubin 
(1978) paved the way for what we now know as meta-analysis: a statistical technique by which 
findings from independent studies can be assimilated.  
The Use of Meta-Analysis over the Past 20 years 
Meta-analysis is generally seen as an important step towards objectifying literature reviews; in 
fact, the extent to which meta-analysis is now regarded as an accurate and objective way to 
assimilate research findings is demonstrated by the proliferation of meta-analytic reviews in the 
major review journals in psychology (e.g. Psychological Bulletin). Figure 1 shows the number of 
published articles using or discussing meta-analysis that have appeared in peer-reviewed science 
journals over the last 20 years. As you might expect, during the early 1980s when the technique 
was being honed by the likes of Hedges and Olkin (1985) and Hunter, Schmidt and Jackson 
(1982), the discussion of meta-analysis was, to say the least, sparse. Given a few years for the 
scientific community to absorb these seminal works (and that of Rosenthal, 1991) the use and 
discussion of meta-analysis suddenly rocketed from under 100 in the late 1980s to the several 
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hundreds by the early to mid 1990s and to over a thousand by the turn of the century. A 
substantial proportion of these papers appear in social science and medical journals1.  
Despite the obvious faith that psychologists and other scientists and practitioners have placed in 
meta-analysis, there is a growing body of evidence to suggest that it is often used incorrectly, 
and may not be the answer to our literature review prayers after all. This article describes the 
principles of meta-analysis before reviewing some of the sources of error that might make us 
doubt whether meta-analysis can be trusted. 
Basic Principles of Meta-Analysis 
As scientists, we measure effects in samples to allow us to estimate the true size of the effect in 
a population to which we don’t have direct access (Field & Hole, 2003). Imagine I were 
interested in knowing the effect of sleep-deprivation on people’s ability to concentrate (and 
write articles about meta-analysis!). There is a true effect that sleep deprivation has, but I don’t 
have access to that true effect because it’s unlikely that I can sleep-deprive an entire 
population of people. Instead I use a small sample taken from that population and estimate the 
true effect that sleep deprivation has, based on the effect in my sample. Now, the chances are 
that lots of other scientists will also be interested in the effects of sleep deprivation on 
concentration, and they too will have used samples to estimate the size of the effect that sleep 
deprivation has. The idea behind meta-analysis is simple: if we take all of these individual 
studies, quantify the observed effect in a standard way and then combine them, we can get a 
much more accurate idea of the true effect in which were interested. Effects can be quantified 
by expressing them as effect sizes (see David Clark-Carter’s article in this edition): Cohen (1988) 
suggested a measure called d, but we can use the Pearson correlation coefficient r, odds ratios 
or risk rates. Typically, the choice of measure depends on the conventions of the research 
                                             
1 Although it might seem that the use of meta-analysis has accelerated more in science generally than the 
social sciences, this is likely to reflect the greater number of science journals. 
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discipline and is not based on statistical reasoning. For example, the correlation coefficient is 
typically chosen to represent the size of a relationship and Cohen’s d is used to quantify the 
degree of difference between group means; however, the correlation coefficient, Pearson’s r, 
can be used to quantify differences between means (see Rosenthal, 1991; Field & Hole, 2003). 
All effect size estimates represent a standardized form of the size of the observed effect, and 
most can be easily transformed into a different metric and back again (see Rosenthal, 1991); 
however, there are often statistical reasons for preferring one metric to another.  
The first step in meta-analysis is, therefore, to express the effect in each study in a uniform 
way. So, if we decide to use r as our effect size measure, we would need to look at each study 
and use the data to calculate the value of r. The mean of these effect sizes can then be 
calculated. In addition, although this isn’t always the primary concern of meta-analysis, the 
probability of obtaining that mean can also be computed (see Field, 2000). In short, we can see 
whether the average effect size is significant, which, to use my sleep deprivation example, 
would tell us the average size and statistical significance of the relationship between sleep 
deprivation and concentration across several studies (from which the size of the effect of sleep 
deprivation on concentration in the population can be inferred). 
Meta-analysis can also be used to find out the variability between effect sizes across studies 
(called tests of the homogeneity of effect sizes) and to explain this variability in terms of 
moderator variables. For example, we might find that in a study that tested concentration using 
a visual task, the effect of sleep deprivation was larger than in a different study that tested 
concentration using an audio task. If we had several studies using visual tasks and several using 
audio ones then we could test whether there was significant variability across effect sizes, but 
also test whether this variability is caused by the modality of the task (audio vs. visual)—see 
Field (2003). 
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Publication Bias and The ‘File Drawer’ Problem 
A major threat to the validity of meta-analysis is that significant findings are more likely to be 
published than non-significant findings. This is both because researchers may lose interest in 
non-significant findings and not submit them (Dickersin, Min & Meinert, 1992) and reviewers may 
scrutinise non-significant findings more closely and reject manuscripts containing them (Hedges, 
1984). Rosenthal (1979) calls this the ‘file drawer’ problem, that is, non-significant research is 
more likely to end up in the researchers file drawer than in a journal! The extent of this problem 
should not be underestimated: Sterling (1959) reported that 97% of articles in psychology 
journals reported significant results, Greenwald (1975) has estimated that significant findings 
were eight times more likely to be submitted than non-significant ones, and unpublished 
research can have effect sizes half the value of comparable published research (Shadish, 1992). 
The effect of this bias is that meta-analytic reviews are likely to over-estimate mean effect sizes 
(and their significance) because they might not include unpublished studies, in which effect 
sizes would have been small.  
Artefacts 
Many different artefacts may also introduce error into a meta-analysis. Although some artefacts 
may be unique to certain research disciplines, those that stem from the measurement of 
variables and the general quality of the research apply in all situations. The accuracy of the 
effect size of a variable will depend largely on how accurately that variable was measured and 
the error in the measurement of variables is likely to vary across studies. For example, one study 
might have used a very reliable questionnaire whereas another uses a less reliable one. In 
addition, correlational research studies can vary in the range of scores elicited from participants 
(range variation), these differences in the range of scores elicited will affect the resulting effect 
sizes. 
More generally, we can say that effect sizes are influenced by the quality of the research. In its 
simplest form, meta-analysis doesn’t take account of the measurement reliability, range 
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differences, or the general quality of research. Although Hunter and Schmidt (1990) have 
suggested statistical techniques for correcting for measurement error and range variation, many 
researchers either do not apply these corrections or apply them incorrectly (Schmidt & Hunter, 
1996). Given that artefacts contribute to differences in effect sizes, an alternative approach is 
to look for significant variability between effect sizes in a meta-analysis (and we’ve seen earlier 
that this is possible). If significant variability is found then potential moderator variables can be 
sought to explain this variability. One possible moderator might be the general quality of the 
research, and Wolf (1986) suggests that the quality of research can be used as a moderator 
variable that tests whether the effect size is significantly different in ‘well-conducted’ and 
‘badly-conducted’ studies. However, this introduces subjective opinion about what is well-
conducted research and so perhaps makes the analysis no more objective that the discursive 
evaluations that meta-analysis seeks to objectify! To make matters worse, although many 
researchers do test for variability between effect sizes, they rarely act upon the results of these 
tests (Hunter & Schmidt, 2000). 
Misapplications of meta-analysis 
Another implication of variability between effect sizes relates to how the meta-analysis is 
conceptualised and calculated. There are two ways to conceptualise meta-analysis: fixed effects 
and random effects models2. These models differ not only in the theoretical assumptions that 
underlie them, but also in how the mean effect size and its significance is computed. The fixed-
effect model assumes that all studies in a meta-analysis come from a population with a fixed 
average effect size: studies in the meta-analysis are sampled from a population in which the 
average effect size is fixed (Hunter & Schmidt, 2000). The alternative assumption is that the 
average effect size in the population varies randomly from study to study: studies in a meta-
                                             
2 There is actually a mixed model too, but for simplicity I’ll ignore it. 
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analysis come from populations that have different average effect sizes, so, population effect 
sizes can be thought of as being sampled from a ‘superpopulation’ (Hedges, 1992). 
Statistically speaking, the main difference between fixed- and random-effects models is in the 
amount of error. In fixed-effects models there is error introduced because of sampling studies 
from a population of studies. This error exists in random-effects models but in addition there is 
error created by sampling the populations from a superpopulation. So, calculating the error of 
the mean effect size in random-effects models involves estimating two error terms, whereas in 
fixed-effects models there is only one error term. 
Another reason why meta-analysis might not be trusted is if the wrong model is used. There is 
considerable theoretical (Field, 2003; National Research Council, 1992; Hunter & Schmidt, 2000) 
and empirical (Barrick & Mount, 1991) evidence that real-world data are likely to reflect the 
random-effects conceptualization (that is, studies come from populations in which the average 
effect size varies). However, Hedges and Vevea (1998) suggested that the choice of model 
depends not on the assumptions about the true state of the world, but on the type of inferences 
that the researcher wishes to make: with fixed-effect models inferences can be drawn only 
about the studies included in the meta-analysis whereas random-effects models allow inferences 
that generalise beyond the studies included in the meta-analysis. Psychologists typically wish to 
generalize beyond the studies included in the meta-analysis and so random-effects models are 
more appropriate (see Field, 2003; Hunter & Schmidt, 2000). 
Despite good evidence that real-world data support a random-effects conceptualisation, the 
relative simplicity of fixed-effects models has meant that psychologists routinely apply them — 
even though the random-effects model is more often appropriate. In fact, even when tests 
reveal significant variability between effect sizes (suggesting a random effects model should be 
used), psychologists do not act upon these tests and apply fixed-effects models regardless 
(Hunter & Schmidt, 2000). Hunter and Schmidt (2000) found 21 recent examples of meta-
analytic studies using fixed-effects models in Psychological Bulletin (the highest impact review 
journal for psychology) compared to none using random effects models. What are the 
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consequences of misapplying fixed-effects models to random-effects data? Well, in short it 
inflates the estimate of the mean effect size and its significance: normally, using a standard 
criterion for significance (p < .05), we would expect to find a significant average effect size, 
when there is no effect in the population, in around 5% of cases (the Type I error rate). Hunter 
and Schmidt (2000) predict that this error rate will increase to between11% and 28% of cases. 
However, Field (2003) has shown using data simulations that in fact the error rates increase to 
anywhere between 43% and 80% in certain circumstances. To put this into perspective, of the 21 
meta-analyses reported by Hunter and Schmidt (2000), between 9 and 17 of them are likely to 
have reported significant average effect sizes when, in reality, no significant effect existed 
within the population.  
… and more seriously 
A more fundamental issue is that given that we assume real-world data follow a random effects 
model and effect sizes vary across studies, then what is the value in seeking an average effect 
size? For example, imagine we tested the efficacy of a powder (‘Stat-Whizz’) that could 
magically make you good at statistics. A trial in the USA found an effect size of .45, a replication 
in Belgium found an effect size of 0, and a further replication in the UK yielded an effect size of 
–.45. If we assume that these studies had equal sample sizes and so were equally weighted in the 
meta-analysis, then the resulting average effect size would be 0—there would be a non-
significant effect. Readers of such a meta-analysis might conclude, therefore, that Stat-Whizz 
was an ineffective drug. Of course, this conclusion is wrong: the drug worked in the USA, didn’t 
work in Belgium and had a negative effect in the UK. As such, the issue of interest is not so 
much the overall effect of the drug, but at what levels the drug works: the fact that the drug 
doesn’t work on the English is of little interest to all of the Americans for whom the drug is 
effective! A retort to this is that such variability would be picked up by tests of the homogeneity 
of effect sizes. However, as mentioned previously, researchers frequently fail to act upon such 
tests (Hunter & Schmidt, 2000). One implication of these observations is that moderator 
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analysis, in which we look for possible variables that explain the variation between effect sizes, 
may be more useful than looking at average effect sizes. 
Methods of meta-analysis 
A final possible source of error in meta-analysis could be due to problems inherent in the 
method used. Three methods of meta-analysis have been popular: the methods devised by 
Hedges and colleagues (Hedges & Olkin, 1985; Hedges, 1992; Hedges & Vevea, 1998), Rosenthal 
and Rubin’s method (1978), or that of Hunter and Schmidt (1990). Hedges and colleagues have 
developed both fixed- and random-effects models for combining effect sizes, Rosenthal and 
Rubin have developed only a fixed-effects model, whereas Hunter and Schmidt label their 
method a random-effects model. The computations of these various methods differ, and the 
technical details of these differences are well-documented elsewhere and are beyond the scope 
of this review (see Field, 2001).  
Several recent studies have compared these methods. Johnson, Mullen and Salas (1995) 
compared the Hedges-Olkin (fixed-effect), Rosenthal-Rubin and Hunter-Schmidt meta-analytic 
methods by manipulating a single data set. They concluded that the significance of the mean 
effect size differed substantially across the methods: the Hunter and Schmidt method reached 
more conservative estimates of significance than the other two methods so should be used 
cautiously. Schmidt and Hunter (1999) subsequently claimed that Johnson et al. incorrectly 
applied their method and showed that, theoretically, when the method was correctly applied, 
their method was comparable to that of Hedges. Field (2001) highlighted some other concerns 
with Johnson et al.’s methods and rectified these concerns in a series of simulations that 
compared the methods across a variety of situations. Field found that when comparing random-
effects methods, the Hunter-Schmidt method yielded the most accurate estimates of population 
effect size across a variety of situations. However, neither method controlled the Type I error 
rate when 15 or fewer studies were included in the meta-analysis, and that the method 
described by Hedges and Vevea (1998) controlled the Type I error rate better than the Hunter-
Schmidt method when 20 or more studies were included. In a more recent set of simulations, 
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Field (2002) demonstrated that across a far-ranging set of situations both methods produce 
biased estimates of the population effect size: however, the biases in the Hunter-Schmidt 
method are not as large as in Hedges’ method. Hedges method did tend to keep tighter control 
of the Type I error rate but with 80 or more studies in the meta-analysis, there was little to 
separate the two methods. With fewer studies in the meta-analysis (20-40), Hedges method 
controlled the Type I error rate considerably better than Hunter and Schmidt’s method. As a 
general rule, neither method was accurate when fewer than 20 studies were in the meta-
analysis. 
Can meta-analysis be trusted? 
To sum up, meta-analysis has come to be seen as the saviour of the literature review, but 
perhaps unjustly. As with all statistical procedures, the results are only as good as the data 
available and the person performing the test: if fixed-effects models continue to be routinely 
applied to psychological data then we risk finding inflated effects. In terms of which method to 
apply, if the primary interest is in estimating the effect in the population then what matters is 
whether it’s better, in the context of the question you’re trying to address, to underestimate 
(Hunter-Schmidt) or overestimate (Hedges) the effect size in the population. If the significance 
of this estimate is important, and there are 80 or more studies in the meta-analysis then either 
method will be fairly reliable, but with 20-40 studies Hedges’ method is preferable, and 
significance tests should not be conducted at all with fewer than 20 studies in the meta-analysis. 
Of course, there is more to meta-analysis than this simple summary suggests. I’ve hinted at the 
fact that moderator variables may often be more interesting than the average effect size. Also 
researchers have to give greater consideration to controlling for other sources of error because 
small statistical differences between the methods discussed here may be relatively unimportant 
compared to biases from other sources such as using unreliable measures.  
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FIGURES 
• Figure 1: Graph showing the number of journal articles published about or using meta-
analysis between 1981 and 2001 in science journals including a line indicating the number 
appearing specifically in social science journals (Source: the Web of Science; 
http://wos.mimas.ac.uk) 
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